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Abstract
This paper develops a theory of optimal unemployment insurance (UI) in matching models.
The optimal UI replacement rate is the conventional Baily-Chetty replacement rate, which
solves the tradeoff between insurance and job-search incentives, plus a correction term, which
is positive when an increase in UI pushes the labor market tightness toward its efficient level.
In matching models most wage mechanisms do not ensure efficiency so tightness is generally
inefficient. The effect of UI on tightness depends on the model: increasing UI may raise
tightness by alleviating the rat race for jobs or lower tightness by increasing wages through
bargaining. (JEL: E24, E32, H21)
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Unemployment insurance (UI) is a key component of social insurance in modern welfare states.
The microeconomic theory of optimal UI, developed by Baily (1978) and Chetty (2006), is well
understood. It is an insurance-incentive tradeoff in the presence of moral hazard. UI helps workers
smooth consumption when they are unemployed, but it also increases unemployment by discour-
aging job search. The Baily-Chetty formula resolves this tradeoff.
But the microeconomic theory only provides a partial description of the effects of UI on un-
employment because, while it accounts for workers’ labor-supply behavior, it ignores firms’ labor-
demand behavior. For instance, UI may exert upward pressure on wages by raising the outside
option of unemployed workers, thereby discouraging job creation by firms. In that case, UI in-
creases unemployment more than in the microeconomic theory. Alternatively, the labor market
may operate like a rat race: firms offer a fixed number of jobs and jobseekers queue for these
jobs. A jobseeker who reduces her search effort is less likely to find a job, but by moving down
the queue, she improves the job prospects of the jobseekers who move ahead of her. In that case,
although UI discourages job search, UI increases unemployment less than in the microeconomic
theory. In these two examples, the microeconomic theory misses important labor-demand channels
through which UI affects unemployment and hence social welfare.
In this paper we develop a macroeconomic theory of optimal UI that extends the microeco-
nomic theory by accounting for firms’ labor-demand behavior. To that end we embed the Baily-
Chetty model of UI into a matching model with generic production function and wage mechanism.
The matching model is well suited for our purpose because it includes both workers searching for
jobs and firms creating jobs.
The labor market tightness—the ratio of firms’ aggregate number of vacancies to workers’
aggregate job-search effort—is central to our theory. Tightness is determined in equilibrium to
equalize labor demand and labor supply. Tightness is important to workers because it influences
their probability of finding a job: a higher tightness implies a higher job-finding rate per unit
of effort. Tightness is important to firms because it determines their recruiting costs: a higher
tightness imposes that a larger share of the workforce is allocated to recruiting instead of producing.
The microeconomic theory of optimal UI considers the effect of UI on labor supply taking
tightness as given; in that, it is only partial equilibrium. In contrast, our macroeconomic theory
is general equilibrium because it considers the effects of UI on labor supply, labor demand, and
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tightness. As UI generally affects tightness and tightness generally affects social welfare, the
results of our macroeconomic theory generally differ from those of the microeconomic theory.
There is a situation in which our optimal UI replacement rate is given by the Baily-Chetty
formula: when the level of tightness is efficient. In that case, tightness maximizes social welfare
for a given UI. Therefore, when a change in UI leads to a variation in tightness, this variation has
no first-order effect on welfare. At the same time, in the Baily-Chetty model, tightness is constant
so UI has no effect on welfare through tightness. It is because UI has no effect on welfare through
tightness both in the Baily-Chetty model and when tightness is efficient in our model that optimal
UI follows the same principles in the two cases.
However, the level of tightness is usually not efficient in matching models, since most wage
mechanisms do not ensure efficiency. When tightness is inefficiently low, increasing tightness
raises social welfare; in that case, unemployment is inefficiently high and too few jobseekers find
a job. When tightness is inefficiently high, reducing tightness raises social welfare; in that case,
unemployment is inefficiently low and firms devote too many workers to recruiting.
And when the level of tightness is not efficient, the replacement rate given by the Baily-Chetty
formula is no longer optimal. This important result has a simple intuition. Imagine for example that
tightness is inefficiently low—that is, increasing tightness raises welfare. If increasing UI raises
tightness, UI is more desirable than the insurance-incentive tradeoff suggests, and the optimal
replacement rate is higher than the Baily-Chetty replacement rate. Conversely, if increasing UI
lowers tightness, UI is less desirable than the insurance-incentive tradeoff suggests, and the optimal
replacement rate is lower than the Baily-Chetty replacement rate.
Formally, we show that the optimal UI replacement rate equals the Baily-Chetty replacement
rate plus a correction term which equals the effect of UI on tightness times the effect of tightness
on social welfare. The correction term is positive if an increase in UI brings tightness closer to
its efficient level, and negative otherwise. Hence, the optimal replacement rate is above the Baily-
Chetty replacement rate when an increase in UI brings tightness closer to its efficient level, and
below the Baily-Chetty replacement rate otherwise.
In matching models, increasing UI may lower or raise tightness. It may lower tightness through
a job-creation channel: when UI increases, the outside option of unemployed workers rises, wages
rise through bargaining, firms create fewer jobs, and tightness falls. Alternatively, it may raise
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tightness through a rat-race channel. Suppose to simplify that the number of jobs is fixed. In
equilibrium, job-search effort times the job-finding rate per unit of effort is equal to the number of
jobs and thus fixed. By discouraging job search, an increase in UI raises the job-finding rate and
therefore tightness. When the number of jobs available is somewhat limited instead of completely
fixed, the same logic applies and an increase in UI raises tightness. The overall effect of UI on
tightness depends on which channel dominates. In the standard model of Pissarides (2000), only
the job-creation channel operates and increasing UI lowers tightness. But in the job-rationing
model of Michaillat (2012), only the rat-race channel operates and increasing UI raises tightness.
To facilitate empirical applications of the theory, we express our optimal UI formula with es-
timable statistics, as in Chetty (2006). We obtain two empirical criteria: one to evaluate whether
tightness is inefficiently high or low, and another one to evaluate whether an increase in UI raises
or lowers tightness. The first criterion is that tightness is inefficiently low when the value of hav-
ing a job relative to being unemployed is high compared to the share of the workforce devoted to
recruiting. The second criterion is that an increase in UI raises tightness when the microelastic-
ity of unemployment with respect to UI is larger than the macroelasticity of unemployment with
respect to UI. The microelasticity measures the increase in unemployment caused by an increase
in UI when the reduction in job-search effort is accounted for but tightness is kept constant. The
macroelasticity measures the increase in unemployment caused by an increase in UI when both
the reduction in job-search effort and the equilibrium response of tightness are accounted for. The
second criterion is simple to understand. Imagine for instance that increasing UI raises tightness.
After an increase in UI, the job-finding rate increases, which partially offsets the increase in un-
employment caused by the reduction in job-search effort; therefore, the macroelasticity is smaller
than the microelasticity.
The paper is organized as follows. Section I develops a generic matching model for the analysis
of UI. Section II expresses social welfare as a function of UI and tightness, and computes the
derivatives of the social welfare function with respect to the two variables. These derivatives
are the building blocks of the optimal UI formula derived in Section III. Section IV studies the
effect of UI on tightness in three specific matching models illustrating the range of possibilities.
Section V shows that our optimal UI formula continues to hold when workers use home production
to partially insure themselves against unemployment and when workers suffer a nonpecuniary cost
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from unemployment. Section VI concludes by discussing empirical applications of the theory.
I. A Generic Matching Model
This section develops a generic matching model for the analysis of UI. This model embeds the
model of UI by Baily (1978) and Chetty (2006) into a matching model that uses the formalism
from Michaillat and Saez (2015a). The model is generic in that it accommodates a broad range of
labor demands, arising from diverse production functions and wage mechanisms. For simplicity
we consider a static model; Landais, Michaillat and Saez (2015) present a dynamic extension of
the model more adapted to quantitative analysis. Table 1 summarizes the notation.
A. The Labor Market
There is a measure 1 of identical workers and a measure 1 of identical firms. Initially, all workers
are unemployed and search for a job, and all firms post vacancies to recruit workers. The matching
function m determines the number of worker-firm matches formed: l = m(e,v), where l is the
number of workers who find a job, e is the aggregate job-search effort, and v is the aggregate
number of vacancies. The function m has constant returns to scale, is differentiable and increasing
in both arguments, and satisfies m(e,v)≤ 1.
The labor market tightness θ is defined by the ratio of aggregate vacancies to aggregate search
effort: θ = v/e. Since the matching function has constant returns to scale, the labor market tight-
ness determines the probabilities to find a job and fill a vacancy. A jobseeker finds a job at a
rate f (θ) = m(e,v)/e = m(1,θ) per unit of search effort; hence, a jobseeker searching with effort
e finds a job with probability e · f (θ). A vacancy is filled with probability q(θ) = m(e,v)/v =
m(1/θ ,1) = f (θ)/θ . Since the matching function is increasing in its two arguments, f (θ) is in-
creasing in θ and q(θ) is decreasing in θ . Accordingly, when the labor market is tighter, workers
are more likely to find a job but vacancies are less likely to be filled. We denote by 1−η and −η
the elasticities of f (θ) and q(θ) with respect to θ .
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Table 1: Notation
Description Definition
Panel A. The labor market
e Job-search effort
v Number of vacancies
m(e,v) Matching function
θ Labor market tightness θ = v/e
f (θ) Job-finding rate per unit of effort f (θ) = m(1,θ)
q(θ) Vacancy-filling probability q(θ) = f (θ)/θ
1−η Elasticity of f (θ) wrt θ 1−η = θ · f ′(θ)/ f (θ)
ρ Recruiting cost
τ(θ) Recruiter-producer ratio τ(θ) = ρ/(q(θ)−ρ)
Panel B. Firms
l Number of employees
n Number of producers n = l/(1+ τ(θ))
w Real wage
y(n) Production function
ld(θ ,w) Labor demand Equation (1)
Panel C. The unemployment insurance program
ce Consumption of employed workers
cu Consumption of unemployed workers
∆c Consumption gain from work ∆c = ce− cu
R Unemployment insurance replacement rate R = 1−∆c/w
∆U Utility gain from work ∆U =U(ce)−U(cu)
SW (θ ,∆U) Social welfare function Equation (6)
εm Microelasticity of unemployment wrt ∆U Equation (8)
ε f Discouraged-worker elasticity Equation (9)
φ Harmonic mean of U ′(ce) and U ′(cu) Equation (12)
εM Macroelasticity of unemployment wrt ∆U Equation (20)
εmR Microelasticity of unemployment duration wrt R Equation (25)
Panel D. Workers
U(c) Utility from consumption
ψ(e) Disutility from job-search effort
es( f ,∆U) Effort supply Equation (3)
ls(θ ,∆U) Labor supply Equation (4)
h Home production
λ (h) Disutility from home production
hs(cu) Home-production supply Equation (32)
ch Consumption of unemployed workers with home
production
ch = cu+hs(cu)
∆Uh Utility gain from work with home production ∆Uh =U(ce)−U(ch)+λ (hs(cu))
z Nonpecuniary cost of unemployment
Panel E. Equilibrium
w(θ ,∆U) Wage mechanism
θ(∆U) Equilibrium tightness Equation (5)
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B. Firms
The representative firm employs l workers paid a real wage w to produce a consumption good.
The firm has two types of employees: n are producing output while l− n are recruiting workers
by posting vacancies. The firm’s production function is y(n). The function y is differentiable,
increasing, and concave.
Posting a vacancy requires ρ ∈ (0,1) recruiters. Since recruiting l employees requires l/q(θ)
vacancies, the numbers of producers and recruiters in a firm with l employees are n= l ·(1−ρ/q(θ))
and l − n = l · ρ/q(θ). Accordingly, the firm’s recruiter-producer ratio is τ(θ) = (l − n)/n =
ρ/(q(θ)−ρ). Furthermore, the numbers of employees and producers are related by l =(1+ τ(θ))·
n. Since q(θ)> ρ and q(θ) is decreasing in θ , τ(θ) is positive and increasing in θ .1 The recruiter-
producer ratio is increasing in tightness because when tightness is higher, the probability to fill a
vacancy is lower, so firms must post more vacancies and thus employ more recruiters to recruit a
given number of workers. The elasticity of τ(θ) with respect to θ is η · (1+ τ(θ)).
The firm sells its output on a perfectly competitive market. Given θ and w, the firm chooses l
to maximize profits y(l/(1+ τ(θ)))−w · l. The labor demand ld(θ ,w) gives the optimal number
of employees. It is implicitly defined by the first-order condition of the maximization:
(1) y′
(
ld(θ ,w)
1+ τ(θ)
)
= (1+ τ(θ)) ·w.
This equation says that a profit-maximizing firm hires producers to the point where their marginal
product, y′(n), equals their marginal cost, which is the wage, w, plus the recruiting cost, τ(θ) ·w.
Since y′(n) is decreasing in n and τ(θ) is increasing in θ , ld(θ ,w) is decreasing in w and, for
common production functions, in θ .2 Intuitively, firms hire fewer workers when the wage is higher
and when tightness is higher because in these conditions the marginal cost of hiring is higher.
1The condition q(θ)> ρ is necessary to have a positive number of producers. It limits tightness to a range [0,θm),
where θm = q−1(ρ).
2The function ld(θ ,w) is decreasing in θ when the elasticity of y′(n) with respect to n is in (−1,0). This condition
is satisfied with the standard specification y(n) = nα , α ∈ (0,1).
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C. The Unemployment Insurance Program
The government’s UI program provides employed workers with consumption ce and unemployed
workers with consumption cu < ce. UI benefits and taxes are not contingent on search effort
because effort is not observable. The generosity of UI is measured by the replacement rate
R≡ 1− ∆c
w
,
where ∆c≡ ce− cu is the consumption gain from work. When a jobseeker finds work, she keeps a
fraction ∆c/w = 1−R of the wage and gives up a fraction R, corresponding to the UI benefits that
are lost.3 The government must satisfy the budget constraint
(2) y(n) = (1− l) · cu+ l · ce.
If firms’ profits are equally distributed, the UI program can be implemented with a benefit b
funded by an income tax t such that cu = profits+b and ce = profits+w−t. If profits are unequally
distributed, they can be taxed fully and rebated lump sum to implement the UI program.
D. Workers
Initially, workers are unemployed and search for a job with effort e. The disutility from job search
is ψ(e). The function ψ is differentiable, increasing, and convex. The probability of becoming
employed is e · f (θ) and the probability of remaining unemployed 1− e · f (θ).
Workers cannot insure themselves against unemployment in any way, so they consume ce if
employed and cu if unemployed. The utility from consumption is U(c). The function U is differ-
entiable, increasing, and concave. We denote by ∆U ≡U(ce)−U(cu) the utility gain from work.
The utility gain from work is higher when UI is less generous.
3Consider a UI program providing a benefit b funded by a tax t so that ∆c = w− t− b. Our replacement rate is
R = (t+b)/w. The conventional replacement rate is b/w: it ignores the tax t and is not the same as R. But in practice,
the conventional replacement rate is approximately equal to R because t is small relative to b. (Indeed, t = b · (1− l)/l
and in practice unemployment 1− l is small relative to employment l).
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Given θ , ce, and cu, the representative worker chooses e to maximize its expected utility
e · f (θ) ·U(ce)+(1− e · f (θ)) ·U(cu)−ψ(e).
The effort supply es( f (θ),∆U) gives the optimal job-search effort. It is implicitly defined by the
first-order condition of the maximization:
(3) ψ ′ (es( f (θ),∆U)) = f (θ) ·∆U.
This equation says that a utility-maximizing jobseeker searches to the point where the marginal
cost of search, ψ ′(e), equals the marginal benefit of search, which is the rate at which search leads
to a job, f (θ), times the utility gain from work, ∆U . Since ψ ′(e) is increasing in e, es( f (θ),∆U) is
increasing in f (θ) and ∆U . Intuitively, jobseekers search more when the job-finding rate is higher
and when UI is less generous because in these conditions the marginal benefit of search is higher.
The labor supply ls(θ ,∆U) gives the number of workers who find a job when they search
optimally. It is defined by
(4) ls(θ ,∆U) = es( f (θ),∆U) · f (θ).
Since es( f (θ),∆U) is increasing in f (θ) and ∆U , and f (θ) is increasing in θ , ls(θ ,∆U) is increas-
ing in θ and ∆U . Intuitively, more workers find a job when tightness is higher because a higher
tightness encourages job search and increases the job-finding rate per unit of effort; more workers
find a job when UI is less generous because a lower UI encourages job search.
E. The Wage Mechanism
As in any matching model, we need to specify a wage mechanism. Common wage mechanisms
include Nash bargaining or a fixed wage. Here we assume that the wage mechanism is a generic
function of tightness and the utility gain from work:
w = w(θ ,∆U).
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With this mechanism, wages depend on labor market conditions and the generosity of UI. Addi-
tionally, we show in the next section that the pair (θ ,∆U) determines all the other variables in a
feasible allocation. Hence, the wage mechanism could be any function of any variable: it is the
most generic wage mechanism possible.
II. Equilibrium and Social Welfare
In this section we describe the equilibrium of the model and express social welfare in an equi-
librium as a function of the generosity of UI and the labor market tightness. We compute the
derivatives of the social welfare function with respect to UI and tightness. These derivatives are
key building blocks of the optimal UI formula derived in Section III. To facilitate empirical appli-
cations of the theory, we follow Chetty (2006) and express the derivatives with estimable statistics.
A. Feasible Allocation and Equilibrium
Before defining an equilibrium, we introduce a concept of feasible allocation that helps separating
issues of insurance and efficiency when we analyze social welfare.
A feasible allocation parameterized by a labor market tightness θ and a utility gain from work
∆U is a collection of five variables {e, l,n,ce,cu} that satisfy five constraints: (i) the job-search
effort maximizes workers’ utility: e = es( f (θ),∆U); (ii) the matching function determines em-
ployment: l = ls(θ ,∆U); (iii) the recruiting cost imposes a wedge between the numbers of pro-
ducers and employees: n= l/(1+τ(θ)); (iv) the consumption levels ce and cu satisfy the resource
constraint, given by (2); and (v) the definition of ∆U is satisfied: U(ce)−U(cu) = ∆U .
Typically a feasible allocation is a collection of quantities satisfying a resource constraint.
Here we have additional constraints because of moral hazard (constraint (i)) and because of the
matching structure on the labor market (constraints (ii) and (iii)). A feasible allocation does not
contain prices, but it is convenient to define a notional wage and a notional replacement rate:
w ≡ y′(n)/(1+ τ(θ)) and R ≡ 1− (ce− cu)/ [y′(n)/(1+ τ(θ))]. Of course, in an equilibrium,
notional wage and replacement rate equal actual wage and replacement rate.
An equilibrium parameterized by a utility gain from work ∆U is a collection of variables
{e, l,n,ce,cu,w,θ} such that (i) {e, l,n,ce,cu} is the feasible allocation parameterized by θ and
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Figure 1: An Equilibrium
∆U ; (ii) the wage is given by the wage mechanism: w = w(θ ,∆U); and (iii) the labor market
tightness equalizes labor supply and labor demand:
(5) ls(θ ,∆U) = ld(θ ,w(θ ,∆U)).
This equation defines θ as an implicit function of ∆U , denoted θ(∆U). This function describes the
equilibrium level of tightness for a given ∆U . All the variables in an equilibrium can be expressed
as a function of ∆U and θ(∆U).
Figure 1 displays an equilibrium in a (l,θ) plane. The intersection of the labor supply and
demand curves gives labor market tightness, employment, and unemployment. The labor supply
curve shifts inward when UI increases. The labor demand curve responds to UI if wages do: when
UI increases, the labor demand curve shifts inward if the wage mechanism is increasing in UI and
it shifts outward if the wage mechanism is decreasing in UI.
B. The Social Welfare Function
DEFINITION 1. The social welfare function SW is defined by
(6) SW (θ ,∆U) = es( f (θ),∆U) · f (θ) ·∆U +U(cu(θ ,∆U))−ψ(es( f (θ),∆U)),
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where cu(θ ,∆U) is implicitly defined by
(7) y
(
ls(θ ,∆U)
1+ τ(θ)
)
= ls(θ ,∆U) ·U−1 (U(cu(θ ,∆U))+∆U)+(1− ls(θ ,∆U)) · cu(θ ,∆U).
The function SW gives the social welfare in a feasible allocation parameterized by θ and ∆U .
The consumption level cu(θ ,∆U) in (6) ensures that the government’s budget constraint is satis-
fied. The term U−1 (U(cu(θ ,∆U))+∆U) in (7) gives the consumption of employed workers when
unemployed workers consume cu(θ ,∆U) and the utility gain from work is ∆U . The function SW
plays a central role in the analysis because it allows us to compute the social welfare in an equi-
librium parameterized by ∆U : in that equilibrium, the social welfare is SW (θ(∆U),∆U), where
θ(∆U) is the equilibrium level of tightness.
To facilitate the analysis of the social welfare function, we define two elasticities that measure
the response of job-search effort to UI and labor market conditions.
DEFINITION 2. The microelasticity of unemployment with respect to UI is
(8) εm ≡− ∆U
1− l ·
∂ (1− ls)
∂∆U
∣∣∣∣
θ
=
∆U
1− l ·
∂ ls
∂∆U
∣∣∣∣
θ
.
The microelasticity measures the percentage increase in unemployment when the utility gain
from work decreases by 1 percent, the change in jobseekers’ search effort is accounted for, but
the equilibrium adjustment of tightness is ignored. Jobseekers reduce their search effort when UI
increases so εm > 0. Because it keeps tightness constant, the microelasticity measures a partial-
equilibrium response of unemployment to UI. In Figure 2, an increase in UI reduces search effort,
which shifts the labor supply curve in; the microelasticity measures this shift. The ideal way to
estimate the microelasticity is to offer higher or longer UI benefits to a randomly selected, small
subset of jobseekers within a labor market and compare unemployment durations between treated
and nontreated jobseekers.
DEFINITION 3. The discouraged-worker elasticity is
(9) ε f =
f (θ)
e
· ∂e
s
∂ f (θ)
∣∣∣∣
∆U
.
The discouraged-worker elasticity measures the percentage decrease in job-search effort when
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Figure 2: The Microelasticity of Unemployment With Respect to UI (εm)
the job-finding rate per unit of effort decreases by 1 percent, keeping UI constant. Jobseekers
search less when the job-finding rate decreases so ε f > 0. The discouraged-worker elasticity can
be estimated by comparing the search effort of jobseekers facing different labor market conditions
but receiving similar UI. Search effort can be measured directly using time-use surveys or indirectly
using the number of job-application methods reported in household surveys.
Equipped with the elasticities εm and ε f , we differentiate the social welfare function:
LEMMA 1. The social welfare function admits the following partial derivatives:
∂SW
∂θ
∣∣∣∣
∆U
=
l
θ
· (1−η) ·φ ·w ·
[
∆U
φ ·w +R ·
(
1+ ε f
)
− η
1−η · τ(θ)
]
(10)
∂SW
∂∆U
∣∣∣∣
θ
= (1− l) · φ ·w
∆U
· εm ·
[
R− l
εm
· ∆U
w
·
(
1
U ′(ce)
− 1
U ′(cu)
)]
,(11)
where φ is the harmonic mean of workers’ marginal consumption utilities:
(12)
1
φ
=
l
U ′(ce)
+
1− l
U ′(cu)
.
Proof. We first compute (10). Since workers choose job-search effort to maximize expected utility,
the envelope theorem says that changes in the effort es( f (θ),∆U) resulting from changes in θ have
no impact on social welfare. The effect of θ on welfare therefore is
(13)
∂SW
∂θ
=
l
θ
· (1−η) ·∆U +U ′(cu) · ∂c
u
∂θ
.
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The first right-hand-side term is obtained by noting that 1−η = θ · f ′(θ)/ f (θ) so e · f ′(θ) =
(l/θ) ·(1−η). This term is the welfare gain created by the employment gain following an increase
in tightness. Higher employment is beneficial to welfare because it allows more workers to enjoy
the high level of consumption ce instead of the low level cu. As we apply the envelope theorem, this
term only accounts for the change in employment resulting from a change in job-finding rate, not
for that resulting from a change in job-search effort. The second right-hand-side term is the welfare
change caused by the adjustment of unemployed workers’ consumption following a change in
tightness. This consumption adjustment is required to satisfy the government’s budget constraint.
Next, we compute the consumption change ∂cu/∂θ . To do that, we implicitly differentiate
cu(θ ,∆U) with respect to θ in equation (7). We need a few preliminary result. First, the definition
of the notional wage imposes y′(n)/(1+ τ(θ)) = w. Second, since ls(θ ,∆U) = es( f (θ),∆U) ·
f (θ), the elasticity of es( f (θ),∆U) with respect to f (θ) is ε f , and the elasticity of f (θ) with
respect to θ is 1−η , the elasticity of ls(θ ,∆U) with respect to θ is
(14)
θ
l
· ∂ l
s
∂θ
∣∣∣∣
∆U
= (1−η) · (1+ ε f ).
Third, the definition of ∆U implies that U−1 (U(cu(θ ,∆U))+∆U)−cu = ∆c. Fourth, the elasticity
of 1+ τ(θ) with respect to θ is η · τ(θ) so the derivative of 1/(1+ τ(θ)) with respect to θ is
−η ·τ(θ)/ [θ · (1+ τ(θ))]. Fifth, the derivative of ce(cu,∆U)≡U−1 (U(cu)+∆U) with respect to
cu is ∂ce/∂cu =U ′(cu)/U ′(ce). Hence, the implicit differentiation of (7) with respect to θ gives
(15)
l
θ
· (1−η) · (1+ ε f ) · (w−∆c)− l
θ
·η · τ(θ) ·w =
(
l
U ′(ce)
+
1− l
U ′(cu)
)
·U ′(cu) · ∂c
u
∂θ
.
The first left-hand-side term is the budgetary gain coming from the new jobs created by an increase
in tightness. Each new job increases government revenue by w−∆c. The new jobs result from a
higher job-finding rate and a higher job-search effort; the term (1+ ε f ) captures the combination
of these two forces. The second left-hand-side term is the loss of resources due to a higher tight-
ness. Indeed, a higher tightness forces firms to allocate more workers to recruiting and fewer to
producing. The entire left-hand side is the change in the resources available to fund the UI program
after a change in tightness. This change dictates the consumption change ∂cu/∂θ .
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Finally, we obtain (10) by inserting into (13) the value of ∂cu/∂θ obtained in (15) and intro-
ducing the variable φ defined by (12).
We follow similar steps to compute (11). The effect of ∆U on welfare is
(16)
∂SW
∂∆U
= l+U ′(cu) · ∂c
u
∂∆U
.
The first term on the right-hand side is the welfare gain enjoyed by employed workers after a
reduction in UI contributions. The second term is the welfare change caused by the adjustment of
unemployed workers’ consumption following a reduction in UI contributions. This consumption
adjustment is required to satisfy the government’s budget constraint.
Next, we compute the consumption change ∂cu/∂∆U . To do that, we implicitly differentiate
cu(θ ,∆U) with respect to ∆U in equation (7). We need two preliminary results in addition to
those above. First, the definition of the microelasticity implies that ∂ ls/∂∆U = [(1− l)/∆U ] ·
εm. Second, the derivative of ce(cu,∆U) =U−1 (U(cu)+∆U) with respect to ∆U is ∂ce/∂∆U =
1/U ′(ce). Hence, the implicit differentiation of (7) with respect to ∆U gives
(17)
1− l
∆U
· εm · (w−∆c)− l
U ′(ce)
=
(
l
U ′(ce)
+
1− l
U ′(cu)
·
)
·U ′(cu) · ∂c
u
∂∆U
.
The first term on the left-hand side is the budgetary gain coming from the new jobs created by
reducing the generosity of UI. The new jobs result from a higher job-search effort. This budgetary
gain is a behavioral effect. The second term is the budgetary loss following the reduction of the
UI contributions paid by employed workers. This budgetary loss is a mechanical effect. These
budgetary changes determine the consumption change ∂cu/∂∆U .
Inserting into (16) the value of ∂cu/∂∆U obtained in (17) and introducing the variable φ de-
fined by (12), we obtain
(18)
∂SW
∂∆U
= (1− l) ·φ ·
[
w
∆U
· εm ·R+ l
1− l ·
(
1
φ
− 1
U ′(ce)
)]
.
Equation (12) implies that 1/φ − 1/U ′(ce) = −(1− l) · (1/U ′(ce)−1/U ′(cu)). Combining this
expression with (18) yields (11).
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C. A Criterion for Efficiency
It is well understood that the equilibrium is generally inefficient in matching models. The reason
is that most wage mechanisms cannot ensure efficiency. The implication is that a small tightness
change triggered by a small wage change generally has a first-order effect on social welfare. When
the wage is inefficiently high, tightness is inefficiently low and a small increase in tightness en-
hances welfare. On the other hand, when the wage is inefficiently low, tightness is inefficiently
high and a small increase in tightness reduces welfare. Last, when the wage and tightness are
efficient, a small increase in tightness has no first-order effect on welfare.
The following proposition provides a criterion to determine whether tightness is efficient:
DEFINITION 4. The efficiency term is
(19)
∆U
φ ·w +R ·
(
1+ ε f
)
− η
1−η · τ(θ).
PROPOSITION 1. Consider a feasible allocation parameterized by a utility gain from work ∆U
and a tightness θ . A marginal increase in θ raises social welfare when the efficiency term is
positive; it has no first-order effect on social welfare when the efficiency term is zero; and it lowers
social welfare when the efficiency term is negative.
Proof. The result directly follows from (10) because social welfare in a feasible allocation param-
eterized by ∆U and θ is given by SW (θ ,∆U).
The proposition shows that an increase in tightness has a positive effect on welfare when the
value of having a job relative to being unemployed (∆U) is high compared to the share of the
workforce devoted to recruiting (τ(θ)). Conversely, an increase in tightness has a negative effect
on welfare when the value of having a job relative to being unemployed is low compared to the
share of the workforce devoted to recruiting. Intuitively, the efficient level of unemployment is
positive because some unemployment allows firms to devote fewer workers to recruiting and more
to production, thus increasing output. While some unemployment is desirable, too much unem-
ployment is costly because it makes too many workers unproductive, thus reducing output, and
because unemployed workers are worse off than employed workers. Hence, the efficient level of
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unemployment and tightness balances the amount of labor devoted to recruiting with the cost of
being unemployed.
Proposition 1 offers an empirical criterion for the efficiency of tightness: tightness is ineffi-
ciently low if the efficiency term is positive, efficient if the efficiency term is zero, and inefficiently
high if the efficiency term is negative. Besides, (5) shows that by choosing the wage, one can
manipulate the labor demand and select the equilibrium level of tightness: the higher the wage,
the lower the labor demand, and the lower the tightness. Therefore, the proposition also offers a
criterion for the efficiency of the wage: the wage is inefficiently high if the efficiency term is pos-
itive, efficient if the efficiency term is zero, and inefficiently low if the efficiency term is negative.
In that, the proposition is closely related to the famous Hosios (1990) condition, which says that
the wage is efficient when workers’ bargaining power is equal to η . There is one major difference,
however. The Hosios condition only applies to the standard matching model with risk-neutral
workers, no unemployment insurance, Nash bargaining over wages, and a linear production func-
tion. Our criterion is much more general: it applies to matching models with risk-averse workers,
unemployment insurance, any wage mechanism, and any production function.
III. The Optimal Unemployment Insurance Formula
The government chooses UI to maximize social welfare subject to the equilibrium relationship
between tightness and UI. Formally, the government chooses ∆U to maximize SW (θ(∆U),∆U),
where SW (θ ,∆U) is defined by (6) and θ(∆U) is implicitly defined by (5). This section derives a
formula characterizing the optimal replacement rate of the UI program. The formula is expressed
with estimable statistics.
To obtain the formula, we need an elasticity measuring the general-equilibrium response of
unemployment to UI:
DEFINITION 5. The macroelasticity of unemployment with respect to UI is
(20) εM ≡− ∆U
1− l ·
d(1− l)
d∆U
=
∆U
1− l ·
dl
d∆U
.
The macroelasticity measures the percentage increase in unemployment when the utility gain
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from work decreases by 1 percent and both the change in jobseekers’ search effort and the equilib-
rium adjustment of tightness are accounted for. In particular, the macroelasticity takes into account
the response of wages to UI; in fact, the response of wages conditions the equilibrium adjustment
of tightness. Because it accounts for the response of tightness to UI, the macroelasticity measures
the general-equilibrium response of unemployment to UI.
When wages are weakly increasing in UI, εM > 0—that is, raising UI increases unemployment.
This assumption is natural as higher UI improves workers’ outside option. (The assumption is
satisfied in the three specific models considered in Section IV.) The macroelasticity is positive
under this assumption because raising UI depresses both the labor supply (by reducing search
effort) and the labor demand (by increasing wages). Figure 3 illustrates the result: in both panels,
employment is lower when UI is higher so the macroelasticity is positive.
Estimating the macroelasticity is inherently more difficult than estimating the microelasticity
because the estimation requires exogenous variations in UI benefits across comparable labor mar-
kets, not exogenous variations in UI benefits across comparable individuals within a labor market.
The ideal way to estimate the macroelasticity is to offer higher benefits to all individuals in a
randomly selected subset of labor markets and compare unemployment rates between treated and
nontreated labor markets.
The macroelasticity matters because the wedge between the macroelasticity and the microelas-
ticity measures the effect of UI on tightness:
DEFINITION 6. The elasticity wedge is 1− εM/εm. The elasticity wedge is positive if εM < εm,
zero if εM = εm, and negative if εM > εm.
PROPOSITION 2. The elasticity wedge measures the equilibrium response of tightness to UI:
(21)
∆U
θ
· dθ
d∆U
=−1− l
l
· 1
1−η ·
εm
1+ ε f
·
(
1− ε
M
εm
)
.
The elasticity wedge is positive when tightness increases with the generosity of UI, negative when
tightness decreases with the generosity of UI, and zero when tightness does not respond to UI.
Proof. Since l = ls(θ ,∆U), we have
εM =
∆U
1− l ·
dl
d∆U
=
∆U
1− l ·
∂ ls
∂∆U
+
[
θ
1− l ·
∂ ls
∂θ
]
·
[
∆U
θ
· dθ
d∆U
]
.
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Figure 3: The Sign of the Elasticity Wedge 1− εM/εm Gives the Effect of UI on Tightness
Notes: In Panel A, wages and thus the labor demand curve do not respond to UI. In Panel B, wages are increasing in
UI so the labor demand curve shifts inward when UI increases.
Using (8) and (14), we obtain
(22) εM = εm+
[
l
1− l · (1−η) ·
(
1+ ε f
)]
·
[
∆U
θ
· dθ
d∆U
]
.
Dividing this equation by εm and rearranging the terms yields (21).
The proposition shows that a wedge appears between macroelasticity and microelasticity when
UI affects tightness, and that this wedge has the same sign as the effect of UI on tightness. Figure 3
illustrates this result. The horizontal distance A–B measures the microelasticity and the horizontal
distance A–C measures the macroelasticity. In Panel A, the labor demand curve is downward
sloping, and it does not shift with a change in UI. After an increase in UI, the labor supply shifts
inward (A–B) and tightness increases along the new labor supply curve (B–C). Hence, tightness
rises after the increase in UI, and the macroelasticity is smaller than the microelasticity. In Panel B,
the labor demand also shifts inward after an increase in UI. Tightness falls along the new labor
supply curve after the shift in labor demand (C’–C). Overall, tightness may rise or fall depending
on the amplitude of the labor-demand shift. In Panel B, tightness falls after the increase in UI,
and the macroelasticity is larger than the microelasticity. In Section IV we will consider several
specific models to explore further the channels through which UI affects tightness.
Having described the effect of UI on tightness, we can derive the optimal UI formula:
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PROPOSITION 3. The optimal UI replacement rate satisfies
(23) R =
l
εm
∆U
w
[
1
U ′(ce)
− 1
U ′(cu)
]
+
[
1− ε
M
εm
]
1
1+ ε f
[
∆U
wφ
+
(
1+ ε f
)
R− η
1−η τ(θ)
]
.
The first term in the right-hand side is the Baily-Chetty replacement rate and the second term is
the correction term.
Proof. The first-order condition of the government’s problem is 0 = dSW/d∆U . The total deriva-
tive of social welfare with respect to ∆U satisfies dSW/d∆U = ∂SW/∂∆U+(∂SW/∂θ)·(dθ/d∆U).
The equation 0 = ∂SW/∂∆U is the Baily-Chetty formula. The term ∂SW/∂θ is proportional to
the efficiency term (Proposition 1). The term dθ/d∆U is proportional to the elasticity wedge
(Proposition 2). Hence, the optimal UI formula is the Baily-Chetty formula plus a correction term
proportional to the efficiency term times the elasticity wedge.
More precisely, we compute (23) by plugging into the first-order condition 0 = ∂SW/∂∆U +
(∂SW/∂θ) · (dθ/d∆U) the expressions for ∂SW/∂∆U , ∂SW/∂θ , and dθ/d∆U given by equa-
tions (11), (10), and (21). Then we divide the resulting equation by (1− l) ·φ ·w · εm/∆U .
COROLLARY 1. If labor market tightness is efficient, the optimal UI replacement rate satisfies the
Baily-Chetty formula:
(24) R =
l
εm
· ∆U
w
·
[
1
U ′(ce)
− 1
U ′(cu)
]
.
Proof. The result directly follows from Propositions 1 and 3.
Formula (23) shows that the optimal UI replacement rate is the Baily-Chetty replacement rate
plus a correction term. The Baily-Chetty replacement rate solves the tradeoff between the need for
insurance, measured by 1/U ′(ce)− 1/U ′(cu), and the need for incentives to search, measured by
εm, as in the work of Baily (1978) and Chetty (2006). The correction term is the product of the
effect of UI on tightness, measured by the elasticity wedge, and the effect of tightness on welfare,
measured by the efficiency term. Hence, the correction term is positive when an increase in UI
pushes tightness toward its efficient level.
Our formula is similar to the optimal government purchases formula derived by Michaillat
and Saez (2015b) in another matching model: both formulas correct a standard formula from
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public economics with a term that is positive when the policy brings tightness closer to its efficient
level. Our formula is also similar to numerous optimal tax formulas obtained in the presence of
externalities: all these formulas have an additive structure with a standard term plus a correction
term. The similarity arises because the response of tightness to UI is akin to a pecuniary externality;
indeed, tightness acts as a price influencing welfare when the equilibrium is inefficient.
As in many optimal tax formulas, the right-hand side of formula (23) is endogenous to UI. Even
though the formula characterizes optimal UI only implicitly, it is useful because it transparently
shows the economic forces at play and because it gives the conditions under which the optimal UI
replacement rate is above or below the Baily-Chetty replacement rate.
There are two situations in which the correction term is zero and the optimal UI replacement
rate is given by the Baily-Chetty formula. The first situation is when UI has no effect on tightness
such that the elasticity wedge is zero. In that case, our model and the Baily-Chetty model are
isomorphic so they have the same optimal UI. The second situation is when tightness is efficient
such that the efficiency term is zero. This is the situation described by Corollary 1. In that case, the
marginal effect of UI on tightness has no first-order effect on welfare. Hence, in our model as in
the Baily-Chetty model, UI has no effect on welfare through tightness, and optimal UI is governed
by the same principles.
It may not be apparent that formula (24) is equivalent to the traditional Baily-Chetty formula,
but the equivalence becomes clear once we introduce the microelasticity of unemployment duration
with respect to the replacement rate. This elasticity is denoted εmR and defined by
(25) εmR =−
∂ ln(es · f (θ))
∂ ln(R)
∣∣∣∣
θ ,ce
.
The elasticity εmR can be estimated by measuring the change in average unemployment duration
(1/(es · f (θ))) generated by changing unemployment benefits (cu) but keeping tightness (θ ) and
the consumption of employed workers (ce) constant. In the empirical literature the microelasticity
εmR is more frequently estimated than the microelasticity ε
m found in our formulas; but εm is more
convenient for theoretical work.
The elasticities εmR to ε
m are closely related. Consider a change dR keeping ce and θ constant.
Since 1− ls = s/(s+ es · f (θ)), we have d ln(1− ls) = −l · d ln(es · f (θ)). As ∆c = (1−R) ·w,
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we have cu = ce− (1−R) ·w and the change dR implies a change dcu = w · dR, which implies a
change d∆U = −U ′(cu) · dcu = −U ′(cu) ·w · dR. Since εm = −∆U · d ln(1− ls)/d∆U and εmR =
R · d ln(es · f (θ))/dR, we obtain εm = εmR · l ·∆U/(U ′(cu) ·w ·R) . Using this relationship, we can
rewrite (24) as the traditional Baily-Chetty formula:
(26) εmR =
[
U ′(cu)
U ′(ce)
−1
]
.
A weakness of the traditional expression of the Baily-Chetty formula is that the elasticity εmR cannot
be stable with R. The elasticity has to be zero when R = 0, so it has to increase with R for R
small enough. In contrast, the elasticity εm found in our expression of the Baily-Chetty formula
can potentially be stable with R. For example, if the disutility from job-search effort is a power
function ψ(e) = δ · e1+1/κ with parameters δ and κ , then we see from equations (3) and (4) that
εm is constant and equal to κ .
When the correction term is nonzero, the optimal UI replacement rate departs from the Baily-
Chetty replacement rate. For instance, when increasing UI pushes tightness toward its efficient
level, the correction term is positive and the optimal replacement rate is above the Baily-Chetty
replacement rate. This happens either if tightness is inefficiently low and increasing UI raises tight-
ness or if tightness is inefficiently high and increasing UI lowers tightness. In terms of estimable
statistics, this happens if the efficiency term and elasticity wedge are both positive or both negative.
Table 2 summarizes all the possibilities.
One result requires additional explanation. Consider the case in which an increase in UI raises
tightness. We find that the optimal replacement rate is above the Baily-Chetty replacement rate
when tightness is inefficiently low. Besides, we know that unemployment is inefficiently high
when tightness is inefficiently low, and that an increase in UI raises unemployment (under the
natural assumption that wages are weakly increasing in UI). Hence, our finding implies that raising
unemployment through UI is desirable when unemployment is inefficiently high. How can this be
the case? Imagine that UI is at the Baily-Chetty replacement rate and that tightness is inefficiently
low. A small increase in UI raises insurance, which is good for welfare; it reduces job-search effort,
which is bad for welfare; and it raises tightness, which is good for welfare. At the Baily-Chetty
replacement rate, the cost of lower effort offsets the benefit of higher insurance; the only remaining
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Table 2: Optimal UI Replacement Rate Compared to Baily-Chetty Replacement Rate
Elasticity wedge < 0 Elasticity wedge = 0 Elasticity wedge > 0
Efficiency term > 0 lower same higher
Efficiency term = 0 same same same
Efficiency term < 0 higher same lower
Notes: The UI replacement rate is R = 1− (ce− cu)/w. The Baily-Chetty replacement rate is given by (24). The
efficiency term is ∆U/(φ ·w)+(1+ ε f ) ·R− [η/(1−η)] · τ(θ). The elasticity wedge is 1− εM/εm. Compared to the
Baily-Chetty replacement rate, the optimal replacement rate is higher if the correction term in formula (23) is positive,
equal if the correction term is zero, and lower if the correction term is negative.
effect on welfare is the positive effect from higher tightness. Overall, as the effect of the UI reform
on welfare is positive, it is optimal to increase UI above the Baily-Chetty replacement rate. At
the same time, the increase in UI raises unemployment because the increase in unemployment due
to lower job-search effort dominates the decrease in unemployment due to higher tightness (see
Figure 3, Panel A). But because the rise in unemployment due to lower job-search effort is already
internalized in the Baily-Chetty formula, it is the decrease in unemployment due to higher tightness
that determines deviations from the Baily-Chetty formula. Since unemployment is inefficiently
high, the decrease in unemployment pushes the optimal replacement rate above the Baily-Chetty
replacement rate.
An implication of formula (23) is that even if UI is provided by private insurers, the public
provision of UI is justified. Indeed, small private insurers do not internalize the effect of UI on
tightness and offer insurance at the Baily-Chetty replacement rate. It is therefore optimal for the
government to correct privately provided UI by a quantity equal to the correction term, which may
be positive or negative.
Formula (23) reveals some interesting special cases. A first case is when UI has no adverse
effect on unemployment (εM = 0). Maybe surprisingly, complete insurance is undesirable in that
case. In fact, if tightness is efficient, UI is given by the Baily-Chetty formula and the magni-
tude of εM is irrelevant. It is true that UI redistributes consumption from employed to unem-
ployed workers without destroying jobs, but because εM = 0 while εm > 0, an increase in UI
raises tightness and forces firms to devote more workers to recruiting, thus reducing output avail-
able to consumption. Hence, the optimal replacement rate is below 1. To see this formally, set
εM = 0 and R = 1 (which implies ∆U = 0 and ce = cu) in formula (23). The resulting equation is
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1 = 1−η · τ(θ)/[(1+ ε f ) · (1−η)], which never holds. Hence, R = 1 is never optimal. More-
over, the right-hand side is always smaller than the left-hand side, so reducing R at R = 1 has a
positive impact on welfare. Hence, the optimal R is strictly below 1.
A second case is when workers are risk-neutral (U(c) = c). Although there is no need for
insurance, some UI may be desirable in that case. It is true that the Baily-Chetty replacement
rate is 0; nevertheless, formula (23) shows that when the correction term is positive, the optimal
replacement rate is positive. Furthermore, since U(c) = c, the efficiency term simplifies to 1+
R · e f +η · τ(θ)/(1−η), so it is easy to determine whether tightness is inefficiently high or low:
tightness is inefficiently low when τ(θ)< (1−η) · (1+R · e f )/η .
The third case is when UI has no adverse effect on job search (εm = 0). Although there is no
need to provide job-search incentives, complete insurance may be undesirable in that case. It is
true that the Baily-Chetty replacement rate is 1; nevertheless, formula (23) shows that when the
correction term is negative, the optimal replacement rate is below 1. Since UI has no effect on job
search, UI has an effect on tightness only if it affects wages; accordingly, the correction term is
nonzero only if UI affects wages. Imagine for instance that an increase in UI raises wages. In that
case, εM > εm = 0 so an increase in UI lowers tightness. This implies that the optimal replacement
rate is below 1 when tightness is inefficiently low.
Last, formula (23) can be empirically implemented because it is expressed with observable
variables (R, l, w) and estimable statistics. The statistics from the Baily-Chetty formula (εm,
∆U , U ′(c), φ ) have been estimated in many studies (see Krueger and Meyer (2002) and Chetty
and Finkelstein (2013) for surveys). The statistics from the matching framework (η , τ(θ), ε f )
have also been estimated in the literature: many studies measure η (see Petrongolo and Pissarides
(2001) for a survey), and a few papers estimate ε f and τ(θ) (for instance, Shimer (2004), DeLoach
and Kurt (2013), Mukoyama, Patterson and Sahin (2014), and Gomme and Lkhagvasuren (2015)
measure ε f , while Barron, Berger and Black (1997), Silva and Toledo (2009), and Villena Roldan
(2010) measure τ(θ) or related quantities). Finally, the elasticity wedge (1−εM/εm) is new to our
formula, but a growing number of papers estimate it (for example, Lalive, Landais and Zweimu¨ller
2015; Marinescu 2016; Johnston and Mas 2016). Exploiting all this empirical evidence, Landais,
Michaillat and Saez (2015) implement the formula for the United States.
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Table 3: Three Specific Matching Models
Model
Standard Fixed-wage Job-rationing
Production function linear linear concave
Wage mechanism bargaining fixed fixed
Elasticity wedge 1− εM/εm negative zero positive
Reference Pissarides (2000) Hall (2005) Michaillat (2012)
IV. The Elasticity Wedge in Three Specific Matching Models
Section III showed that the optimal generosity of UI depends on the effect of UI on tightness. It also
showed that this effect is measured by the wedge between macroelasticity and microelasticity of
unemployment with respect to UI. But Section III remained vague on the channels through which
UI affects tightness and creates an elasticity wedge. To illustrate possible channels, this section
considers three matching models with different wage mechanisms and production functions (see
Table 3). The models illustrate a job-creation channel that creates a negative elasticity wedge and
a rat-race channel that creates a positive elasticity wedge.
A. The Standard Model of Pissarides (2000)
The production function is linear: y(n) = n. When a worker and a firm are matched, they bargain
over the wage. The worker’s bargaining power is β ∈ (0,1).4 The surplus from the match is shared,
with the worker keeping a fraction β of the surplus.5
We begin by determining the bargained wage. The worker’s surplus from the match is ∆U .
Once a worker is recruited, she produces 1 unit of good and receives a real wage w; hence the
firm’s surplus from the match is 1−w. The total surplus from the match is 1−w+∆U . Worker
and firm split the total surplus so ∆U = β ·(1−w+∆U) and 1−w= (1−β ) ·(1−w+∆U). Thus,
the wage satisfies
w = 1− 1−β
β
·∆U.
4To obtain a positive wage, we impose β/(1−β )> ∆U .
5In a seminal paper, Diamond (1982) also assumes a surplus-sharing solution to the bargaining problem. If workers
and firms are risk neutral, the surplus-sharing solution coincides with the generalized Nash solution. Under risk
aversion, the two solutions generally differ. We use the surplus-sharing solution for simplicity.
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Increasing UI lowers ∆U and thus raises wages. Intuitively, an increase in UI raises jobseekers’
outside option, which enables them to bargain higher wages.
We combine the wage equation with (1) and y′(n) = 1 to obtain the labor demand:
(27)
τ(θ)
1+ τ(θ)
=
1−β
β
·∆U.
The labor demand is perfectly elastic with respect to tightness. In the (l,θ) plane of Figure 4,
Panel A, the labor demand curve is horizontal. Since τ(θ) increases with θ and ∆U decreases with
UI, the labor demand curve shifts downward when UI increases. Intuitively, the labor demand is
depressed when UI is higher because an increase in UI pushes wages up through bargaining, which
makes it less profitable to hire workers.
Having obtained the labor demand, we describe the elasticity wedge:
PROPOSITION 4. In the standard model the elasticity wedge is negative:
1− ε
M
εm
=− l
1− l ·
1−η
η
· 1+ ε
f
εm
< 0.
Proof. We differentiate (27) with respect to ∆U . Since the elasticities of τ(θ) and 1+ τ(θ) with
respect to θ are η · (1+ τ(θ)) and η · τ(θ), we obtain (∆U/θ) · (dθ/d∆U) = 1/η . Then, we
use (21) to obtain the expression for the elasticity wedge.
Panel A of Figure 4 illustrates the proposition. After an increase in UI, jobseekers search
less, shifting the labor supply curve inward by a distance A–B. In addition, wages rise through
bargaining, shifting the labor demand curve downward and further increasing unemployment by
the horizontal distance B–C. The total increase in unemployment is given by the horizontal distance
A–C. Since A–C is larger than A–B, the macroelasticity is larger than the microelasticity and the
elasticity wedge is negative.
The increase A–B in unemployment occurs through the moral-hazard channel: an increase in
UI reduces job-search effort—a source of moral hazard because it is unobservable—and thus raises
unemployment. The increase B–C in unemployment occurs through the job-creation channel,
which operates as follows. An increase in UI raises wages and thus reduces the profitability of
creating jobs. This reduction leads to a decline in tightness and a further increase in unemployment.
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Proposition 4 implies that an increase in UI reduces tightness. Thus, in the standard model,
the optimal replacement rate is below the Baily-Chetty rate when tightness is inefficiently low and
above it when tightness is inefficiently high.
In the standard model, tightness is inefficiently low when workers’ bargaining power, β , is
inefficiently high. Namely, tightness is inefficiently low when the efficiency term is positive, or
τ(θ) < (1−η) · [∆U/(φ ·w)+R · (1+ ε f )]/η . Using equation (27), we can transform this in-
equality into a condition on β . We find that tightness is inefficiently low if and only if
(28) β >
η+(1−η) ·
[
∆U
φ ·w +R ·
(
1+ ε f
)]
η+(1−η) ·
[
∆U
φ ·w +R · (1+ ε f )
]
· (1+ 1∆U ) .
This condition generalizes the Hosios condition to situations with risk aversion and unemployment
insurance.6 If workers are risk neutral (U(c) = c so ∆U = ∆c and φ = 1) and there is no unem-
ployment insurance (R = 0 and ∆c = w), the bargained wage simply is w = β and inequality (28)
reduces to β > η , which is the traditional Hosios condition.
B. The Fixed-Wage Model of Hall (2005)
The production function is linear: y(n) = n. The wage is fixed: w = ω , where ω ∈ (0,1) is a
parameter. Unlike the bargained wage from the standard model, the fixed wage does not respond
to UI. We combine the wage equation with (1) and y′(n) = 1 to obtain the labor demand:
(29) 1 = ω · (1+ τ(θ)) .
The labor demand is perfectly elastic with respect to tightness. In the (l,θ) plane of Figure 4,
Panel B, the labor demand curve is horizontal. The labor demand curve is unaffected by UI because
wages do not respond to UI.
Having obtained the labor demand, we describe the elasticity wedge:
PROPOSITION 5. In the fixed-wage model the elasticity wedge is 0.
Proof. In equilibrium, θ is determined by (29). Equation (29) is independent of ∆U so dθ/∆U = 0.
6Since the right-hand side of (28) depends on β and ∆U , the constraint on β imposed by (28) is only implicit.
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Figure 4: The Elasticity Wedge 1− εM/εm in Three Specific Matching Models
Using (21), we conclude that εM = εm.
Panel B of Figure 4 illustrates the result. In the fixed-wage model, UI affects employment only
through the moral-hazard channel; the wage does not respond to UI so the job-creation channel is
eliminated. Hence, the macroelasticity equals the microelasticity and the elasticity wedge is zero.
Since macroelasticity and microelasticity are equal, UI has no effect on tightness and optimal
UI is always given by the Baily-Chetty formula, even if tightness is inefficient. Basically, the
fixed-wage model is isomorphic to the Baily-Chetty model as tightness is constant in both models.
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C. The Job-Rationing Model of Michaillat (2012)
The production function is concave: y(n)= nα , where α ∈ (0,1) parameterizes decreasing marginal
returns to labor. The wage is fixed: w = ω , where ω ∈ (0,1) is a parameter. Unlike the bargained
wage from the standard model, the fixed wage does not respond to UI.
We combine the wage equation with (1) to obtain the labor demand:
(30) ld(θ ,ω) =
(ω
α
)− 11−α · (1+ τ(θ))− α1−α .
Since τ(θ) is increasing in θ , ld(θ ,ω) is decreasing in θ . Intuitively, when tightness is higher,
hiring producers requires more recruiters and is less profitable, so firms employ fewer workers.
Moreover, the labor demand does not respond to UI because the wage does not. In the (l,θ) plane
of Figure 4, Panel C, the labor demand curve is downward sloping and unaffected by UI.
As the labor demand is downward sloping, there is job rationing when the wage is high enough.
Indeed, we have ld(θ = 0,ω) < 1 when ω > α . In Figure 4, Panel C, the labor demand curve
crosses the x-axis at l < 1 when ω > α . This means that jobs are rationed: firms would not hire all
the jobseekers even if the jobseekers searched infinitely hard and tightness were zero.
Having characterized the labor demand, we describe the elasticity wedge:
PROPOSITION 6. In the job-rationing model the elasticity wedge is positive:
(31) 1− ε
M
εm
=
1
1+ η1−η · α1−α · 11+ε f · τ(θ)
> 0.
Proof. The elasticity of 1+τ(θ)with respect to θ is η ·τ(θ). Hence, (30) implies that the elasticity
of ld(θ ,ω) with respect to θ is −η · τ(θ) ·α/(1−α). Since εM is l/(1− l) times the elasticity of
l with respect to ∆U and l = ld(θ ,ω) in equilibrium, we infer that
εM =− l
1− l ·η ·
α
1−α · τ(θ) ·
∆U
θ
· dθ
d∆U
.
We plug into the equation the expression of (∆U/θ) · (dθ/d∆U) given by (21) and obtain
εM =
η
1−η ·
α
1−α ·
1
1+ ε f
· τ(θ) · (εm− εM) .
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Dividing this equation by εm and rearranging the terms yields (31).
Panel C of Figure 4 illustrates the proposition. After an increase in UI, jobseekers search less,
shifting the labor supply curve inward by a distance A–B. Since the labor demand curve is down-
ward sloping and does not respond to UI, the initial increase in unemployment is attenuated by a
horizontal distance B–C. The total increase in unemployment is given by the horizontal distance
A–C. Since A–C is smaller than A–B, the macroelasticity is smaller than the microelasticity and the
elasticity wedge is positive. However, since A–C is positive, the macroelasticity remains positive.
The increase A–B in unemployment occurs through the moral-hazard channel. The reduction
B–C in unemployment occurs through the rat-race channel. This channel is absent from the stan-
dard and fixed-wage models. It operates as follows. The number of jobs available is somewhat
limited because of decreasing marginal returns to labor in production. When a jobseeker searches
less, she reduces her probability of finding a job but mechanically increases others’ probability
of finding one of the few available jobs. Thus, by discouraging job search, UI alleviates the rat-
race for jobs and increases the job-finding rate per unit of effort.7 This increase in job-finding rate
leads to a reduction in unemployment that partially offsets the increase in unemployment occurring
through the moral-hazard channel.
Proposition 6 implies that an increase in UI raises tightness. Thus, in the job-rationing model,
the optimal replacement rate is above the Baily-Chetty rate when tightness is inefficiently low and
below it when tightness is inefficiently high. In the job-rationing model, tightness is inefficiently
low when the level of the fixed wage, ω , is inefficiently high. Following the same steps as in the
standard model, we could derive a condition on ω for tightness to be inefficiently low.
Here the rat-race channel appears because of decreasing marginal returns to labor in production,
but alternative assumptions could give rise to it. In fact, the channel operates as soon as the labor
demand is downward sloping in a (l,θ) plane such that the number of jobs is limited for a given
tightness. For instance, an aggregate demand on the product market as in the model by Michaillat
7To see this formally, consider an increase in UI and assume that the job-finding rate per unit of effort, f (θ),
remains constant. This assumption implies that tightness, θ , and therefore the marginal recruiting cost, τ(θ), remain
constant. As the wage, w, is constant, the marginal cost of labor, w · (1+τ(θ)), also remain constant. Simultaneously,
because jobseekers search less, firms recruit fewer workers and the marginal product of labor is higher because of
decreasing marginal returns to labor. Hence, firms face the same marginal cost but a higher marginal product of labor.
This is suboptimal: firms could increase profits by posting more vacancies and recruiting more workers. Consequently,
θ and f (θ) are higher after the increase in UI.
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and Saez (2015a, Section 3) would give rise to the rat-race channel even under constant marginal
returns to labor in production.
V. Robustness of the Formula
This section shows that the optimal UI formula derived in Section III is robust. The formula
continues to hold when workers partially insure themselves against unemployment through home
production and when workers suffer a nonpecuniary cost from unemployment.
A. The Formula With Partial Self-Insurance Against Unemployment
Section III assumes that workers cannot insure themselves against unemployment. In reality work-
ers are able to partially insure themselves against unemployment using saving, spousal income, and
home production (Gruber 1997; Aguiar and Hurst 2005). Here we assume that workers partially
insure themselves against unemployment with home production. Home production is a convenient
representation of all the means of self-insurance available to workers.
The UI program provides employed workers with consumption ce and unemployed workers
with consumption cu. In addition to consuming cu, unemployed workers consume an amount h
produced at home at a utility cost λ (h). The function λ is differentiable, increasing, and convex,
with λ (0) = 0.
Unemployed workers choose h to maximize their utility U(cu+h)−λ (h). The home-production
supply hs(cu) gives the optimal level of home production. It is implicitly defined by the first-order
condition of the maximization:
(32) λ ′ (hs(cu)) =U ′ (cu+hs(cu)) .
This equation says that a utility-maximizing unemployed worker produces to the point where the
marginal cost of home production, λ ′(h), equals the marginal benefit of home production, U ′(cu+
h). Since λ ′(h) is increasing in h and U ′(c) is decreasing in c, hs(cu) is decreasing in cu. Intuitively,
unemployed workers produce less at home when UI benefits are more generous because higher
benefits reduce the marginal value of home production. When home production is optimal, the
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consumption of unemployed workers is ch = cu+hs(cu) and the utility gain from work is ∆Uh =
U(ce)−U(ch)+λ (hs(cu)).
With home production, formula (23) carries over once the utility gain from work is adjusted
from ∆U to ∆Uh and the marginal utility of unemployed workers is adjusted from U ′(cu) to U ′(ch).
Indeed, the optimal UI replacement rate satisfies
R =
l
εm
∆Uh
w
[
1
U ′(ce)
− 1
U ′(ch)
]
+
[
1− ε
M
εm
]
1
1+ ε f
[
∆Uh
wφ
+
(
1+ ε f
)
R− η
1−η τ(θ)
]
.
In this formula, φ is redefined using ch instead of cu and the elasticities εm, εM, and ε f are redefined
using ∆Uh instead of ∆U . The formula is derived like formula (23).8 In a similar way, Chetty
(2006) generalizes the work of Baily (1978) to account for partial self-insurance.
Self-insurance affects both the Baily-Chetty replacement rate and the efficiency term in the
formula. In the Baily-Chetty replacement rate, the value of insurance is reduced to 1/U ′(ce)−
1/U ′(ch) < 1/U ′(ce)− 1/U ′(cu); hence, the Baily-Chetty replacement rate is lower. In the effi-
ciency term, the utility gain from work is reduced to ∆Uh = minh {U(ce)−U(cu+h)+λ (h)} <
U(ce)−U(cu) = ∆U ; hence, the efficiency term is lower. Accordingly, the correction term is lower
if the elasticity wedge is positive but higher if the elasticity wedge is negative. Overall, with partial
self-insurance, the optimal UI replacement rate is unambiguously lower if the elasticity wedge is
positive, but it may be higher or lower if the elasticity wedge is negative.
8Repeating the derivation of (23) is simple except for two steps. First, the social welfare function admits a slightly
different expression:
SW (θ ,∆Uh)= es( f (θ),∆Uh)· f (θ)·∆Uh+U(cu(θ ,∆Uh)+hs(cu(θ ,∆Uh)))−λ (hs(cu(θ ,∆Uh)))−ψ(es( f (θ),∆Uh)).
But, because unemployed workers choose home production to maximize their utility, the envelope theorem says that
changes in home production hs(cu(θ ,∆Uh)) resulting from changes in θ and ∆Uh have no impact on social welfare.
Therefore, (13) and (16) remain valid once ∆U and U ′(cu) are replaced by ∆Uh and U ′(ch). Second, since ∆Uh =
U(ce)−U(cu+hs(cu))+λ (hs(cu)), the consumption of employed workers is given by
ce(θ ,∆Uh) =U−1
(
U(cu(θ ,∆Uh)+hs(cu(θ ,∆Uh)))−λ (hs(cu(θ ,∆Uh)))+∆Uh
)
.
But, because unemployed workers choose home production to maximize U(cu+h)−λ (h), changes in hs(cu(θ ,∆Uh))
resulting from changes in θ and ∆Uh have no impact on ce(θ ,∆Uh). Therefore, (15) and (17) remain valid once ∆U
and U ′(cu) are replaced by ∆Uh and U ′(ch).
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B. The Formula With a Nonpecuniary Cost of Unemployment
Section III assumes that the well-beings of unemployed and employed workers differ only be-
cause unemployed workers consume less. But unemployment has detrimental effects on mental
and physical health that go beyond what lower consumption would induce.9 Some of the early
studies on unemployment and health suffered from two issues. First, they were not able to separate
between causality (unemployment causes low health) and selection (people who have low health
become unemployed). But recent studies, such as Burgard, Brand and House (2007) and Sullivan
and von Wachter (2009), are able to identify the causal effect from unemployment to low health.
Second, they were not able to control for the loss of income associated with unemployment and
thus separate between the pecuniary and nonpecuniary costs of unemployment. But recent studies,
such as Winkelmann and Winkelmann (1998), Di Tella, MacCulloch and Oswald (2003), Blanch-
flower and Oswald (2004), and Helliwell and Huang (2014), find that unemployed workers report
much lower well-being than employed workers even after controlling for household income and
other personal characteristics. This lower well-being seems to stem from higher anxiety, lower
self-esteem, and lower life satisfaction (Darity and Goldsmith 1996; Theodossiou 1998; Krueger
and Mueller 2011).
Here we assume that unemployed workers have utility U(cu)− z, where the parameter z cap-
tures the nonpecuniary cost of unemployment. The utility gain from work therefore is ∆U z =
U(ce)−U(cu)+ z. Given the amount of evidence that unemployment entails significant nonpecu-
niary costs, it is likely that z > 0. In theory, however, it is possible that z < 0. In that case, workers
enjoy nonpecuniary benefits from unemployment—for instance, additional time for leisure.
When unemployed workers suffer a nonpecuniary cost z, formula (23) carries over once the
utility gain from work is adjusted from ∆U to ∆U z = ∆U + z. Indeed, the optimal UI replacement
rate satisfies
R =
l
εm
∆U z
w
[
1
U ′(ce)
− 1
U ′(cu)
]
+
[
1− ε
M
εm
]
1
1+ ε f
[
∆U z
wφ
+
(
1+ ε f
)
R− η
1−η τ(θ)
]
.
9The detrimental effects of unemployment on mental and physical health are documented by a large literature. See
Dooley, Fielding and Levi (1996), Hawton and Platt (2000), Frey and Stutzer (2002), and Winkelmann (2014) for
surveys and Murphy and Athanasou (1999) and McKee-Ryan et al. (2005) for meta-analyses.
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In this formula, the elasticities εm, εM, and ε f are redefined using ∆U z instead of ∆U . The formula
is obtained like formula (23).
The nonpecuniary cost of unemployment affects the efficiency term but not the Baily-Chetty
replacement rate in the formula. (In the Baily-Chetty replacement rate, the ∆U z in the numerator
cancels out with the ∆U z in the numerator of εm.) Hence, as already noted by Chetty (2006), the
Baily-Chetty replacement rate is independent of the level of well-being of unemployment workers.
Furthermore, since ∆U z = ∆U + z, the efficiency term is higher when z > 0. Accordingly, when
z > 0, the correction term is higher if the elasticity wedge is positive but lower if the elasticity
wedge is negative. Overall, when z > 0, the optimal UI replacement rate is higher if the elasticity
wedge is positive but lower if the elasticity wedge is negative.
VI. Conclusion
This paper proposes a theory of optimal UI in matching models. The optimal UI replacement rate
is the sum of the conventional Baily-Chetty replacement rate, which solves the tradeoff between
insurance and job-search incentives, and a correction term, which is positive when an increase in
UI pushes labor market tightness toward its efficient level. Hence, the optimal replacement rate is
higher than the Baily-Chetty replacement rate if tightness is inefficiently low and an increase in UI
raises tightness, or if tightness is inefficiently high and an increase in UI lowers tightness.
In some countries, including the United States, the generosity of UI depends on the unemploy-
ment rate. Our formula provides guidance to link the generosity of UI to labor market conditions.
It indicates that if UI has an influence on tightness and if tightness is inefficiently high or low, UI
should be adjusted to bring tightness closer to its efficient level.
We propose empirical criteria to determine whether an increase in UI raises or lowers tightness
and whether tightness is inefficiently high or low. Landais, Michaillat and Saez (2015) apply these
criteria to the United States. They find that an increase in UI raises tightness and that tightness
is inefficiently low in slumps and inefficiently high in booms. Our theory combined with their
empirical findings suggests that in the United States, the optimal UI replacement rate is above the
Baily-Chetty replacement rate in slumps but below it in booms.
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